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Abstract:Many linguists refer to Kant, but they do not really seem to take him seriously. I will try to show that a little
closer look at  Kant's  cognitive model might yield insight into certain important  aspects of the syntactic-
semantic constitution of the sentence in different languages. I will also show that Hamann, Herder and their
many followers are completely wrong in arguing that Kant's model was influenced by his own language
without himself knowing it. In the present work, I am especially concerned with the difference between space
and time adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other hand. In a series of publications, I have
investigated the French interrogative word pourquoi ('why'), which, contrary to the other interrogative words,
cannot be followed by stylistic inversion, and I have tried to explain why pourquoi, which functions as a
causal  adjunct,  behaves  differently  from  quand  ('when')  and  où ('where),  adjuncts  of  time  and  place
respectively. During this exploration, it struck me that most of the peculiarities attached to the causal adjuncts
in French and the way they differed from time and place adjuncts were exactly the same in Danish even
though these languages differ radically in lexicon, morphology and syntax. It appears that English and, more
surprisingly, two non Indo-European languages – namely, Japanese and Hungarian – behave in the same way
as French and Danish. I explain this difference between causal adjuncts and time and place adjuncts by
postulating a different degree of attachment to the verb, and I have created a sentence model which seem to
fit nicely into Kant's cognitive model. This might indicate that we are dealing with something universal.
Keywords:  Causal  adjuncts,  Danish,  English,  French,  Hungarian,  Japanese,  Kant,  syntax,  semantics,
typology.
1. Introduction: Kant's attitude towards language
The notion of "Kantian Grammar" might seem like a joke, for, not only did Kant never write a
grammar, he is even notorious for having paid no attention to language at all. This "bad reputation"
seems to have begun with his contemporaries, Hamann and Herder, who started an intellectual feud
shortly after the publication of the  Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]),1 accusing
Kant  of  continuing  the  thought-language  dualism  of  the  Enlightenment,  according  to  which
thoughts and concepts were in principle independent of language (cf. Forster 2012: 487). Hamann
and Herder even argued that Kant was unaware of the role that language played in the construction
of  his  own  cognitive  model.  This  line  of interpretation  of  Kant  has  persisted  ever  since  the
eighteenth century. Thus Waxman (2005: 103, as quoted in Forster 2012: 487) states that Kant's
"psychologistic  explications  resolve   the  elements  of  discursive  thought  into  a  non-discursive
psychological process from which everything linguistic in nature has been excluded in favor of the
nature and workings of the individual, isolated psyche".
However, in 2012 and 2014 two publications appeared with the very telling titles: Forster's
(2012) article "Kant's Philosophy of Language?" (with a question mark) and Schalow & Velkley's
(2014) anthology  The  Linguistic Dimension of  Kant's  Thought  (this  time without  any question
mark!).2 So what is this all about? Let us take a brief look at what is said in these publications.
Following the directions given by Schalow and Velkley (2014: 4), I will first present some of
Kant's explicit  statements about language,  as quoted by Forster (2012) and Schalow & Velkley
* Thanks to Carina Bagge, Klara Kaare Frederiksen, Helle Jørgensen Kirsten Minami, Birgitte Regnar and Michael
Larsen for precious help.
1 Hamann: Metacritique on the Purism of Reason (circulated privately from 1784 although not published until 1800).
Herder: Metacritique on the Critique of Pure reason (1799) (cf. Forster 2012: 486–87).
2 Schalow & Velkley (2014) contains 12 remarkable "Historical and Critical Essays", in which distinguished Kant
scholars examine the many ways in which Kant's philosophy addresses the nature of language. Unfortunately there
is no room to discuss them all here.
ISSN: 2246-8838 Research article
Kantian grammar Globe, 2 (2015)
(2014).  Secondly, I will look at "certain implicit insights about language which can be explicated
through further examination" of his writings. And thirdly, I will consider "the influences Kant had
on subsequent thinkers who did consider the nature of language" Schalow and Velkley (2014: 4).
As Forster (2012: 488) remarks, in spite of the fact that Kant, in  Critique of Pure Reason,3
"scrupulously  avoids  using  such  terms  as  'language',  'sentence',  and  'word'  in  fundamental
explanatory  roles,  in  favor  of  using  such  purely  psychological  terms  as  'thought',  judgement',
'concept', 'representation', 'intuition', 'principle', 'schema' 'idea' and so on", closer investigations of
all his publications reveal many explicit references to language. Below are some examples:
– "our cognition has need of a certain means, and this is language" (Vienna Logic [1780 or
1790], Forster 2012: 489)
– "the logicians are wrong in defining a proposition as judgement expressed in words; for we
also need to use words in thoughts for judgements that we do not express as propositions"
(On a Discovery [1790], Forster 2012: 489)
– "thinking is  talking with oneself" (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1798],
Forster 2012: 490)
– "words are the means best adapted to signifying concepts" (Forster 2012: 490)
Forster (2012: 488) and Schalow & Velkley (2014: 6) both point out that Kant might also have
operated "on the foundation of the unquestioned premise that all thinking is speaking" (cf. Brandt
1991, quoted by Forster 2012: 488). 
Given  that  the  incredible  number  of  pages  that  Kant  left  is  intellectually  tough  reading,
looking for the implicit insights will probably be a perennial process. Schalow's (2014) analysis of
"the language of time in Kant's transcendental schematism" seems to be a very interesting step
forwards. Schalow stresses the importance of the section "Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment or
Analytic  of  Principles" (Kant  1993  [1781,  1787]:  142ff.), where  Kant  "schematizes"  the  pure
concepts, presenting time as "the source of the determinations distinctive of each one of them"
(Schalow 2014: 56). Time forms part of a kind of "lexicon" "that is universal, because its chief
idioms, for example, "succession", "permanence", "presence", form an awareness that is common to
all human beings" (Schalow 2014: 57) and "it is in conjunction with time that the pure concepts
acquire synonymous determinations (e.g., of "permanence" for substance, "presence" for existence,
"succession"  for  cause  and  effect)."  (Schalow  2014:  63).  Although  Kant  emphasized  that  the
transcendental imagination was not inherently discursive, Schalow argues that "through the strategic
role  that time plays,  however,  the formative power of imagination can nevertheless graphically
exhibit  a  genre  of  distinctions  –  as  etched  through  a  temporal  nexus  –  which  prefaces  the
development of language in its predicative form", some sort of profound "semiotic level"4 (Schalow
2014: 57). One could almost talk of a preliminary dictionary.5 We will return to the pure concepts in
section  2.3  below,  where  the  difference  between  "sensibility"  ("Anschauungsformen")  and
"understanding" ("Verstandsbegriffe") will be discussed, and where the "temporal schema" of the
pure concept "Cause" will be presented. Here, let us look very briefly at some of the subsequent
thinkers who were influenced by Kant.
Schalow  &  Velkley  (2014:  4)  draw  particular  attention  to  Ernst  Cassirer6 and  Martin
3 This also applies to his other two  Critiques (Critique of Practical Reason  from 1788 and  Critique of Judgement
from 1790).
4 Schalow has borrowed this term from La Rocca (1989) who talks of a "Semiotische Ebene".
5 Schalow's description resembles that of Baron (2006), who discusses "une zone cognitive indépendante de la langue,
d'origine « préverbale » " ('a cognitive zone that is independent of language'), the only difference being that Baron
considers the spatial relations as the basis, whereas the basis for Schalow (and Kant) is "time". See also 3. Below.
6 Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) "spearheaded the 'back to Kant' movement in the 1920s and expanded the frontiers of
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Heidegger.7 As is well known, the latter has had an enormous influence on the so-called "linguistic
turn",  the  most  important  characteristic  of  which  is  the  focusing  primarily  on  the  relationship
between philosophy and language. Heidegger constantly refers to Kant in his publications but, as
Schalow remarks (Schalow 2014: 65), it is probably the following quote from a 1973 seminar at
Zähringen  that  "most  aptly  summarizes  the  importance  that  Kant's  schematism  played  in  the
development of Heidegger's overall project": schematism is "the Kantian way of discussing being
and time".
The above-mentioned authors succeed in showing that, even if Kant did not formulate any
explicit philosophy of language, he did care about language, and he certainly paved the way for the
linguistic turn.
In this article I will proceed more radically by "explicating" another "implicit insight" hidden
in Critique, which permits me to claim that Kant's cognitive model can be used to explain certain
important aspects of the syntactic-semantic constitution of the sentence in different (and probably
all) languages. While the above-mentioned works look at Kant's publications from a philosopher's
point of view, so to speak, my point of view will be that of a grammarian.
In section 2,  I  will  demonstrate  this  by analyzing the difference between space and time
adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other hand. My object language is first of all
French which I compare to Danish and English. But in order to test the universality of the model, I
also look briefly at two (randomly chosen) non-Indo-European languages, namely Japanese and
Hungarian.  In 3, I will return to Hamann and Herder (and their many "followers") and ask the
following question: Is it  really true that Kant underestimated the importance of language in the
model presented in Critique?
2. Examination of the notions of time, place and cause and their linguistic expressions
2.1. Cause in traditional grammar and cognitive approaches to grammar
As  grammarians  do  not  agree  on  how  to  deal  with  the  notion  of  cause,  I  will  offer  a  brief
presentation of some typical descriptions to begin with.
To Lakoff  & Johnson (1980:  69),  causation,  an  "experiential  gestalt",  "is  a  basic  human
concept. It is one of the concepts most often used by people to organize their physical and cultural
realities". "Cause" can manifest itself on different levels and in different syntactic functions. Lakoff
& Johnson (1980: 70ff.) and Lakoff (1987: 54-55) argue that the prototypical causation "appears to
be  direct  manipulation,  which  is  characterized  most  typically  by  a  cluster  of  interactional
properties" (such as a human agent provoking, directly, a change in a patient, using his hands, body,
or some instrument, etc.). A typical example of direct causation is a transitive construction like the
following:
(1) Sam killed Harry.
Here cause and result are expressed through a single morpheme, and agent and patient have both
participant roles. As Lyons puts it (1977: 489), "the vast majority of trivalent and bivalent verbs in
all languages are most commonly used with an agentive subject and (…) their meaning is generally,
though not always, causative". The same verb can be used in constructions like (2) where the the
process of "excessive drinking" is reified and treated as an entity having the same function as Sam
in (1):8 
transcendental philosophy to include a symbol, myth, and culture" (Schalow & Velkley 2014: 4).
7 Martin  Heidegger's  (1889–1976)  best  known book,  Being  and  Time,  is  considered  one  of  the  most  important
philosophical works of the 20th century.
8 In such cases, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 25ff.) speak of "ontological metaphors".
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(2) Excessive drinking killed Bill. (Lyons 1977: 490)
While  (1)  and  (2)  express  a  single  event,  (3),  which  contains  the  causative  auxiliary  cause,
expresses "two separate events, Harry's death and what Sam did to cause it" (Lakoff & Johnson
1980: 131):
(3) Sam caused Harry to die. 
This sentence "indicates indirect or remote causation" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 131). Example (4),
where the instigation and the effect are expressed in two separate clauses, "indicates a still weaker
causal link" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 131):
(4) Sam brought it about that Harry died.
In all the constructions (1)–(4), although to different extents, agent and patient have both participant
roles. This is not the case in (5) where the cause is indicated by a causal clause or a prepositional
phrase, both of which take up a circumstantial role (i.e. as causal adjuncts):
(5) (Why did they stop playing?) They stopped playing because it had started to rain/because
of the rain. 
The constructions in (5) indicate the reason why the game had to stop. As we move from (1) to (5),
there is a gradual decrease in attachment to the "center"of the sentence. The type of construction
represented in (1) I will call "internal causation", whereas I will call the type represented in (5)
"external causation". It is not quite clear where to draw the line between the two types.9 In what
follows, I will only look at the external causation-type represented by (5). 
That  causation is  such a basic  human concept  is  also what  appears  from Brunot's  (1922:
812ff.) famous treatise, La pensée et la langue ('Thought and Language' in English). Brunot devotes
five chapters (VI–X) to show how easily a causal sense arises when two propositional contents are
combined,  even  if  the  construction  was  originally  "created"  for  other  purposes  (e.g.  temporal
connections):10
(6) Dès qu'on constate la fièvre, c'est qu'il y a infection (Brunot 1922: 814)
As soon as you see the fever, it is because there is an infection.
The notion of CAUSE is one of the "Semantic Primitives" laid down by Wierzbicka (1996: 70, 137,
186ff.). Referring to Kant, Wierzbicka (1996: 70) remarks that "causation – with time and space –
constitutes one of the basic categories of human cognition; it is not a category that we learn from
experience but one of the categories which underlie our interpretation", and she points out that "data
from language acquisition,  as  well  as  from cross-cultural  semantics,  are  consistent  with Kant's
view" (Wierzbicka 1996: 70).11 As seen in my discussion of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) theory
9 As Lyons remarks (1977: 490): "the distinction between a single temporally extended situation and two distinct, but
causally connected, situations is not something that is given in nature, as it were".
10 My translation of  "… l'esprit  établit  entre  les  faits  les  plus  divers  un  rapport  de  causalité,  en  partant  d'autres
rapports." (Brunot 1922: 821–22).
11 Wierzbicka (1996: 70) remarks, on the one hand, that apparently all languages have a lexical exponent of causation
(whether it  is a conjunction like  because, a noun like  cause, or an ablative suffix), and on the other hand, that
because-sentences appear quite early in children's speech "despite the highly abstract and "non-emperical" character
of the concept of causality".
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above, CAUSE, even if it is a basic human concept, is not really a "semantic primitive". But this
does not need to bother us here. What I do want to challenge is the analysis according to which
causation belongs to the same level as time and space. We will return to this problem in 2.2.–2.4.
below.
2.2. The strange behavior of pourquoi
In  a  series  of  publications  (Korzen  1983,  1985,  1990,  2009),  I  have  investigated  the  French
interrogative word  pourquoi  ('why'),  which, contrary to the other interrogative words, cannot be
followed by stylistic inversion (but has to be combined with clitic inversion):
(7) a. Qui est cette jolie fille?
Who is that beautiful girl?
b. Que fera Jean-Michel?
What will Jean-Michel do?
c. A quoi pensait Jean-Michel?
What was Jean-Michel thinking of?
d. Quand reviendra votre belle-mère?
When will your mother-in-law come back?
e. Où est garée votre voiture?
Where is your car parked?
f. Comment va votre fils?
How is your son?
g. *Pourquoi pleure votre fils? → Pourquoi votre fils pleure-t-il?
Why is your son crying?
In these publications I have tried to explain why  pourquoi, which functions as a causal adjunct,
behaves differently from quand ('when') and où ('where'), adjuncts of time and place respectively.
During this  exploration,  it  struck me that, with the exception of subject inversion,  most of the
peculiarities attached to the causal adjuncts in French – and the way they differed from time and
place adjuncts – were exactly the same in Danish and in English, even though the three languages
are very different in so many other regards (cf. Herslund & Baron 2003, 2005; Herslund 2015;
Durst-Andersen 2011).  In the above-mentioned publications,  I  explained the difference between
causal adjuncts and time and place adjuncts by postulating a different degree of attachment to the
verb, as we shall see in 2.4. below.  But why is there this difference in attachment? And why do
causal adjuncts behave in the same way in languages which differ so much in other respects?
At any rate, Wierzbicka's analysis, according to which the three notions of time, space and
cause belong to the same level,  all of them being semantic primitives,  "irreducible categories of
human language and cognition" (Wierzbicka 1996: 71), fails to explain why, then, the expressions
for cause behave so differently from those expressing time and place. In order to explain this, we
have to take a closer look at Kant's cognitive model again.
2.3. Time, space and cause in Kant's Critique of Pure reason
In his Critique (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]), where he sets out to examine the foundations of human
knowledge, Kant places the role of the human subject, or knower, at the center of our inquiry into
nature, pointing out that all objects about which the mind can think must conform to its – rather
limited – manner of thought. Since we can never escape the innate constraints of our minds, we
must  deal  with them and accept  that  it  is  impossible  to  philosophize about  things as  they are,
independently of us.  Thus Kant makes a clear distinction between things as they appear to us as
human beings, which are appearances in space and time, and the thing-in-itself ("das Ding an sich"),
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which we cannot ever come to know. Kant characterizes the shift in point of view that made him
focus  on  the  human  cognitive  apparatus  rather  than  the  "outer  world"  as  his  "Copernican
Revolution", because he attempted to reverse the mind-world relationship just as Copernicus had
reversed the sun-earth relationship. 
Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 45) points out that "there are two sources of of human knowledge
(which  probably  spring  from  a  common,  but  to  us  unknown  root),  namely  sensibility
("Anschauunsgformen")12 and  understanding  ("Verstandesbegriffe").  By  the  former,  objects  are
given to us, by the latter, they are thought.". Thus, in the first place, it is a matter of the aptitude to
capture by the senses (sensibility), and in the second place the aptitude to interpret (understanding)
what  we  have  sensed  e.g.  as  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  Kant  considers  both  aptitudes  as
necessary (and inherent in man):
Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensible faculty
no object would be given to  us,  and without  the understanding no object would be
thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts, blind. Hence
it is as necessary for the mind to make its concepts sensible (that is, to join to them the
object in intuition), as it is to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under
concepts). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding
cannot intuit, and the sensible faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united
operation of both, can knowledge arise. (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]: 69-70)
But Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 69-70) explicitly warns us against conflating the two:
But  no  one  ought,  on  this  account,  to  overlook  the  difference  of  the  elements
contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish
them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, Aesthetic,
from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, Logic
Besides, the distinction between the two faculties appears clearly from the organization of the book.
They are both discussed in the first (and longest) part: "Trancendental Doctrine of Elements". This
part, which deals with the fundamental building blocks of experience, is divided into two chapters:
1)  "Transcendental  Aesthetic"  and 2) "Transcendental  Logic".  Let  us take a brief  look at  these
chapters.
"Transcendental  Aesthetic"  deals  with  the  two  forms  of  sensibility  that  are  a  priori
conditions  for  any  possible  experience  –  namely,  Space and  Time. Space  is  a  necessary
presupposition for being able to observe at all. Or, as Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 50) puts it himself: 
Space (…) is a necessary representation a priori, which serves for the foundation of all
external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the
non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in
it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of appearances,
and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation a priori,
which necessarily supplies the basis for external appearances.
It is a universally valid and necessary (i.e., a priori) truth that everything must necessarily be found
at some place or other (cf. Hartnack 1967: 18). As for Time, Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 56) points
out that
12 The English word sensibility does not really render the sense of Anschauung, but it is difficult to find another word. 
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Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is,  of the intuitions of
ourselves and of our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward
appearances. It has to do with neither shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines
the relation of representations in our inner state.
We cannot experience anything without presupposing time. One cannot imagine a world that is not
in time, i.e., a world where nothing happens either before, at the same time as, or after something
else. It is a universally valid and necessarily true proposition that every event and process occurs at
a given moment in time and that every process takes a certain time (cf. Hartnack 1967: 23). 
"Transcendental logic" treats the fundamental concepts13 of understanding, which Kant calls
categories.14 The categories synthesize the random data of the sensory manifold into intelligible
objects.There  are  twelwe  categories,  among  which  we  find  the  relation  of  "Causality  and
Dependence (cause and effect)"15 (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]: 85):
(8) 1.
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
2.
Of Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation
3.
Of Relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)  (the bold characters are mine)
Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)
4.
Of Modality
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Non-existence
Necessity – Contingence
The  categories  under  'quantity'  and  'quality'  Kant  calls  'the  mathematical  categories';  these
categories  indicate  the conditions for making judgements about objects  in space and time.  The
categories  under  'relation'  and  'modality'  Kant  calls  "the  dynamic  categories";  these  categories
indicate how an object is determined in relation to other objects.
As  should  be  clear  from  the  discussion  above,  Cause  –  a  dynamic  category  –  differs
completely from Space and Time, the two forms of sensibility. Indeed, one could say that it is, in a
certain  sense,  less  fundamental  than  these.  Moreover,  already before  setting  out  to  explain  the
"Transcendental Doctrine of Elements", Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 45) explicitly states:
13 These concepts are a priori concepts, i.e., concepts that are not formed by abstracting from experience (cf. Hartnack
1965: 32).
14 Cf. Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 85):  "These concepts we shall,  with Aristotle,  call  categories,  our  purpose being
originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great difference in the execution".
15 As we saw in section 1. above, the temporal schema corresponding to cause and effect is that of succession.
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So far as the faculty of sensibility may contain representations a priori, which form the
conditions  under  which  objects  are  given,  in  so  far  it  belongs  to  transcendental
philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sensibility must form the  first part of our
science of elements, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human
knowledge are given, must precede those under which they are thought [the bold
characters are mine]
Thus, Kant does not place "Cause" at the same level as "Space" and "Time" regardless different
linguists seem to have meant. Directly connected to the senses, "Space" and "Time" constitute the
preconditions for any possible experience and function as "the scene" where experiences appear (cf.
Thomsen 1964: 270). "Cause" adds, as it were, an explanation to the sensed phenomena.
In the following section, we shall see that this difference between Space and Time on the one
hand  and  Cause  on  the  other  hand  has  quite  radical  consequences  for  the  syntactic-semantic
constitution of the sentence.
2.4. Time, space and cause according to Korzen (1985)
In Korzen (1983, 1985, 1990), I examined the special behaviour of cause adjuncts compared to the
other sentence members, particularly space and time adjuncts, from which it distinguishes itself in
several respects. The most spectacular way in which it distinguishes itself is the way that causal
clauses combine with their main sentence as compared to temporal and relative clauses (see section
2.4.2.3.). Below I will show a small representative sample of the characteristic properties of these
syntactic functions.
2.4.1. The hierarchical model
The starting point of my description is the following hierarchical model,16 where the causal adjunct
occupies an intermediary level between the sentence adjuncts (e.g. heureusement) and constituents
capable of triggering stylistic inversion (see section 2.4.2. below):
                Figure 1: The hierarchical model
"Whole Sentence"
Sentence adjuncts "Central Sentence"
                        ("Macro drama")
                Causal adjuncts         "Elementary Sentence"
                                          ("Micro drama")
                                                                          
                                                                        Verb and valency  Space and Time adjuncts
                                                                         complements
                                                                                                           
16 Figure 1 is not a syntactic tree but a graphic representation of the hierarchical organization of the elements that one
can find in a sentence, and the terms "Whole Sentence",  "Central  Sentence" and "Elementary Sentence" mean:
"elements likely to be found in the Whole Sentence etc.". In Korzen (1983, 1985, 1990), these are called "phrase
entière", phrase centrale", and "phrase élémentaire".
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The Central Sentence denotes the proper content, i.e. the part that is asserted, as opposed to the
sentence adjuncts, which are merely "shown" (in the sense of Wittgenstein, cf.  Nølke 1999). In
Korzen (1985), I said that the sentence adjuncts were "periphery elements", and I will use that term
below. The Elementary Sentence, which contains the verb and its valency complements (i.e. those
having participant roles) and possibly space and time adjuncts, denotes the situation which is the
center of interest. In order to abbreviate, I will use the term "elementary constituents" in order to
talk of the valency complements and the space and time adjuncts. These sentence members share
several properties by which they distinguish themselves from the causal adjuncts.
2.4.2. Differences between the causal adjuncts and the elementary constituents
2.4.2.1.The "essential" character of the elementary constituents: quantifiability
The elementary constituents can be considered "essential" because they are necessary in order that
one can say that an event has taken place. If you negate the existence of one of them by means of an
expression signifying "zero", it amounts to negating the whole proposition (cf. de Cornulier 1974:
161). This is what we see in (9): 
(9) a. Personne ne chante. (Subject)
Nobody sings.
b. Jeanne ne mange rien. (Object)
Jane eats nothing
c. Je ne donnerai ce livre à personne. (Indirect object)
I will not give this book to anyone
d. Michèle ne travaille nulle part. (Space adjunct)
Michelle does not work anywhere
e. Michèle ne travaille jamais. (Time adjunct)
Michelle never works
The sentences in signify a) 'There is no singing at all', b) 'Jane does not eat at all', c) 'I will not make
a present of this book at all', d) and e) 'Michelle does not work at all'. In all these constructions the
negated constituents are negation words which form the second part of the negation.  
The causal adjunct does not behave like that. Negating the cause does not amount  to negating
the whole proposition:
(10) Michèle pleure sans raison.
Michelle cries without reason
The sentence in (10) does not mean 'Michelle does not cry at all'. In fact, it happens very often that
someone talks of a phenomenon while maintaining that no other phenomenon provoked it.17 It is
significant that there is no negative word in French that denotes 'for no reason' corresponding to
jamais  ('never') and  nulle part  ('nowhere'). In the other languages too, there are special negative
words corresponding to the French negative words we saw in (9). 
The Danish negative words can all be derived from the Old Norse engi 'nothing'. It must be
admitted, however, that ingensinde ('never') has almost been ousted by aldrig,18 another radical, in
modern Danish:
17 A Google search generated more than 2,000,000 hits sans [aucune] raison and more than 52,000,000 for  without
[any] reason, 19-9 2009.
18 Composed of aldri, dative from aldr 'age' and the negative particle –gi. 
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(11) ingen = nobody 
intet = nothing
intetsteds = nowhere 
ingensinde/aldrig = never
As seen in (11), the English equivalents are all a combination of the negation and a noun or an
adverb (body, thing, where, ever).
In Japanese, the corresponding negative words are derivied via the suffix –mo:
(12) daremo = nobody (cf. dare'who')
nanimo = nothing (cf. nani 'what')
dokodemo = nowhere (cf. doko 'where')19 
An exception is  zenzen ('never'),20 which has its own radical like Danish aldrig. It is important to
notice, however, that both languages have a single word for 'never'.
Hungarian has the following negative words:
(13) senki = nobody (cf. ki 'who')
semmi = nothing (cf. mi 'what')
sehol = nowhere (cf. hol 'where')
soha = never (different from mikor 'when')
However,  there  is  no  corresponding  expression  (i.e.  no  single  word  or  regular  "composition")
denoting  'for  no  reason'  in  any  of  the  mentioned  languages;  they  all  have  to  be  used  with  a
prepositional phrase corresponding to the French sans raison and the English without reason:
(14) a. Danish
uden    grund
without   reason
b. Japanese
riyuu naku 
reason without
c. Hungarian
ok nélkül 
reason without
The fact that negating the cause does not amount to negating the whole proposition might seem
difficult to reconcile with Kant's theory, according to which "causation – with time and space –
constitutes one of the basic categories of human cognition" (Wierzbicka 1996: 70, see also section
2. above). However, here one must bear in mind that Kant did not  place the three notions at the
same level. Space and Time are more fundamental, as they are directly connected to the senses.
What we really mean when we say 'without any reason' is obviously 'without any apparent reason',
i.e. 'for a reason unknown to us/a reason to which we have no access'. The idea of cause does not
really arise until we are presented (preferably several times) with two or more events following one
19 This is not a perfectly correct description: the word needs to combine with a negative morpheme "nai" to express the
negative meaning. But it is a kind of "regular" "composed negation" that has a certain resemblance with the French
composed negation e.g.  Il ne connaît personne 'he does not know anybody',  where  personne  had, originally,  an
affirmative sense. 
20  The same comment as for dodokemo. This word, too, must combine with a negative morpheme.
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after the other. Then the human mind will tend to conclude that there is a causal relation between
them.21 If you "remove" the cause, the world becomes absurd or inexplicable, but if you "remove"
space and time, you pull the rug from under your feet, and there will be nothing left.
We have just seen that it is possible to negate the entire proposition by negating the existence
of one of the elementary constituents by means of an expression signifying 'zero'. On the other
hand, it is possible to "reinforce" it by "reinforcing" one of the elementary constituents. Thus, one
could say that the examples in (16) express a larger quantity of action than the examples in (15):
(15) a. Jean-Michel chante.
Jean-Michel is singing.
b. Jean-Michel a embrassé Maryse.
Jean-Michel kissed Maryse.
c. Jean-Michel a donné des cadeaux à Sophie.
Jean-Michel gave a present to Sophie.
d. On a manifesté à Paris.
They demonstrated in Paris
e. Michel vient ici le mardi.
Michel comes here every Tuesday.
(16) a. Jean-Michel et Pierre chantent. ('il y a deux fois plus de chant')
Jean-Michel and Pierre are singing ('there is twice as much singing')
b. Jean-Michel a embrassé Maryse et Mathilde. ('il y a deux fois plus de baisers')
 Jean-Michel kissed Maryse and Mathilde. ('there is twice as many kisses')
c. Jean-Michel  a  donné  des  cadeaux  à  Sophie  et  à  Irène.  ('il  y  a  deux  fois  plus  de
bénéficiaires')
Jean-Michel gave gifts to Sophie and Irène. ('there are twice as many beneficiaries')
d. On a manifesté à Paris et à Lyon. ('on a manifesté à deux endroits')
They demonstrated in Paris and Lyon. ('they demonstrated in two places')
e. Michel vient ici le mardi et le jeudi. ('Michel vient ici deux fois par semaine')
Michel comes here every Tuesday and every Thursday. ('Michel comes twice a week')
As for the causal adjunct, increasing the number of causes does not result in a "bigger amount of
action", which remains the same in (17) as in (18):
(17) Michel a embrassé Maryse parce qu'il l'aime.
Michel kissed Maryse because he loves her.
(18) Michel a embrassé Maryse parce qu'il l'aime et que le soleil brille.
Michel kissed Maryse because he loves her and the sun is shining.
Sometimes a whole lot of reasons are given for the same situation:
(19) Je ne suis pas allé en classe parce qu'il fait froid, parce qu'il pleut, parce qu'il neige, parce
qu'il gèle, parce qu'il y a du brouillard, parce que le ciel est gris, parce qu'il vente et
qu'il grêle (From Eugene Ionesco's Le bon et le mauvais temps, p. 130)22
Il did not go to school because it is cold, because it is raining, because it is snowing, because
21  The notion of Cause is not empiric, cf. also Hume.
22 Thanks to Birgitte Regnar for supplying me with this wonderful example.
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it is freezing, because it is foggy, because the sky is gray, because the wind is blowing and
because it is hailing.
I  will  say that the elementary constituents  are  "quantifiable".  This quantifiability has important
morpho-syntactic consequences as we shall see below.
2.4.2.2.The n'importe qui type
It is possible to "reinforce", as it were, the truth value of a proposition by saying that the proposition
is true whenever or wherever it takes place, and whatever be the entities that participate in it. In
order to express this phenomenon, there are pronominal phrases corresponding to the quantifiable
constituents like:
(20) English: who(m)ever, whatever, wherever, whenever
French: n'importe qui, n'importe quoi, n'importe où, n'importe quand
Danish: hvem som helst, hvad som helst, hvor som helst, når som helst
Japanese: daredemo, nandemo, dokodemo, itsudemo
Hungarian: akárki, akármi, akárhol, akármikor
Until recently I thought that why and its equivalents could not enter into these constructions, but it
appears that it exists in some of the languages at least:
(21) English: whyever23
French: pour n'importe quelle raison
Danish: af hvilken som helst grund
Japanese: *Dooshitedemo
Hungarian Akármiert, bármiert24
2.4.2.3.Clause combining
Two situations can be connected by the fact that they share the same time, the same space, the same
object, the same person, etc. Thus, they share one of the "essentiel" aspects. In order to express this,
there are combinations of subordinate clauses and their main clauses like (22) in French, (23) in
English and (24) in Danish,25 (25) in Japanese and (26) in Hungarian:
(22) a. Tu peux venir quand tu voudras.
b. Tu peux dîner où tu voudras.
c. Tu peux faire ce que tu voudras.
d. Tu peux épouser qui tu voudras.
(23) a. You can come when(ever) you want.
b. You can dine where(ver) you want.
c. You can do what(ever) you want.
d. You can marry who(ever)/whom(ever) you want.
23 Whyever sems to be much less frequent than whatever: a Google search generated 153.000.000 hits for the latter and
17.600 hits for the former (27-09-2010). In Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, the latter is written in one word,
but the former in two.
24 Akármiért  seems  odd  to  some  informants.  Moreover,  both  expressions  seem  to  appear  later  than  the  other
expressions.  It  does  not  appear  in  Sándor  Eckhard's  dictionary  Magyar-Francia  szótár  1958.  I  thank  Michael
Carsten Larsen for this information. 
25 In the Danish tradition, we call the shared element "common member" (cf. Diderichsen 1946).
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(24) a. Du kan komme når du (end) vil.
b. Du kan spise hvor du  (end) vil.
c. Du kan gøre hvad du (end) vil.
d. Du kan gifte dig med hvem du (end) vil.
(25) a. Anata wa itsudemo  kite mo ii
you theme whenever  you want to come
b. Anata wa dokodemo tabetai tokoro de taberareru
you  theme wherever you want to eat
c. Anata wa nandemo   sukina koto ga dekiru.
You theme whatever    you like to do
d. Anata   wa sukina dare-tomo kekkon   dekiru
you       theme like with whoever marry     can
(26) a. Te jöhetsz amikor akarsz
you come can.2pers.sing when(ever) will.2pers.sing
b. Te ehetsz    ahol akarsz
you eat can   wherever will.2pers.sing
c. Te azt csinálhatsz amit akarsz
you that do can.2pers.sing whatever will.2pers.sing
d. Te megházasodhatsz azzal akivel akarsz
you marry.refl.2pers.sing article, instrument will.2pers.sing
In (22)–(26) the time, place, etc. are non-specific. However, the same "share" is possible when they
are specific:
(27) Pierre est parti quand Charles est venu.
Pierre left when Charles arrived.
(28) Michèle habite dans la maison où Jacques travaille.
Michel lives in the house where Jacques works.
No construction corresponding to (22)–(28) denotes that two events happen for the same reason, so
the causal conjunction is excluded from (29), corresponding to (22)–(24):
(29) French; *Tu peux venir pourquoi tu voudras.
English: *You can come why(ever) you want.
Dansh: *Du kan komme hvorfor du vil.
In all the languages, constructions like (30), which contains a causal clause, express that the event
denoted by the causal clause explains the event denoted by the main sentence. They do not express
that two events happen for the same reason:
(30) Pierre est parti parce que Charles est venu.
Peter left because Charles came.
Of course, it happens that two (or more) situations can be explained by one and the same reason.
Say Paul stayed at home because it was snowing (he hated snow), but Jacques went out because it
was snowing (he loved snow). Theoretically, it should be possible to imagine a construction like
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(31), but it just "sounds" odd:
(31) ?Paul est resté chez lui pour la même raison que celle pour laquelle Jacques est sorti.
Paul stayed at home for the same reason as the reason for which Jacques went out.
No language seems to use such a construction. At any rate, they are not expressible by a single
conjunction. What is "shared" in constructions like (22)–(28) is always one of the essential aspects,
which are, explicitly or implicitly, "present"26 in all situations. They are part of any situation. These
possibilities of clause combining are probably the most spectacular consequence of the difference
between the time and space adjuncts on the one hand, and the causal adjunct on the other. 
The ways two propositions combine can be illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, where Figure 1
represents  the  construction  with  the  common  member,  and  Figure  2  represents  the  causal
construction where the two propositions are connected by an operator:
Figure 2: Common member
 
Figure 3: Operator
This difference between space and time adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other
hand is so radical that it should convince everybody that they can't be placed on the same level.
2.4.2.4.Periphery properties
Being  outside  the  Elementary  Sentence, the  causal  adjuncts  share  certain  properties  with  the
sentence adjuncts. They can for instance be outside the scope of negation and combine directly with
the negative adverb corresponding to not:
(32) French: Pourquoi pas?
English: Why not?
Danish: Hvorfor ikke?
Japanese: Dooshite soo de wa nai deshoo ka?
Hungarian: Miert nem?
That position is excluded for space and time adjuncts in French, English, Danish and Japanese:
(33) French: *Quand pas? *Où pas?
English: *When not? Where not?
Danish: *Hvornår ikke? *Hvor ikke?
26 They do not have to be physically there, but they are always implied.
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Japanese: *Itsu janai? *Doko janai?27
However it is possible in Hungarian:
(34) a. Nikor nem? (when not)
b. Hol nem? (where not)
However, it is very important to notice that the construction is possible with all the interrogatives.
Thus, in Hungarian, we also find:
(35) a. Ki nem? (who not)
b. Ni nem? (what not) 
The causal adverb, in (32) occupies exactly the same place as unfortunately in (36):
(36) French: Malheureusement pas!
English: Unfortunately not!
Danish: Desværre ikke!
Hungarian: Sajnos nem!
Like sentence adjuncts, but unlike space and time adjuncts, causal adjuncts may also modify elliptic
sentences:
(37) French: Michel va venir. – Pourquoi Michel? *Quand Michel? *Où Michel?
English: Michel will come. – Why Michel? *When Michel? *Where Michel?
Danish: Michel kommer. – Hvorfor Michel? *Hvornår Michel? *Hvor Michel?
Hungarian: Miert Mikkel?
The constructions in (37) are the same kind of constructions as (38) where the sentence adjunct
unfortunately and its equivalents modify the elliptic construction:
(38) French: Qui va venir? – Michel, malheureusement.
English: Who will come? – Michel, unfortunately.
Danish: Hvem kommer? – Michel, desværre. 
Hungarian: Mikkel, sajnos.
This difference between space and time adjuncts and the adjuncts which are outside the Elementary
Sentence is probably due to the fact that an elliptic sentence already, implicitly, contains the other
Elementary constituents (i.e. time and place adjuncts, etc.), for which reason it can only be modified
by "external" sentence members. 
2.5. Partial conclusion: Causal adjuncts compared to space and time adjuncts
It should appear from 2.4. that space and time adjuncts share important properties with the other
elementary constituents. All these constituents denote essential aspects of the situation which is the
center of interest, and because of that, they differ from all other constituents that can be found in a
sentence. The causal adjunct, on the other hand, is excluded from this exclusive circle, and it shares
27 My anonymous referee adds the following commentary: "They might become acceptable in some extremely rare
contexts, but I would judge them as unacceptable by default".
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several properties with the sentence adjuncts.28
In 2.1., where I quoted Lakoff & Johnson, Brunot and Wierzbicka, I stated that causation is
such a basic notion, whereas I have just said that the causal adjunct does not denote an "essential
aspect of the situation". So we might seem, to be left with a paradox. However the paradox is only
apparent, because we have looked at the constructions from two different points of view: when we
look at  a sentence denoting a  single propositional content,  the causal  adjunct is  not "essential"
(recall section 2.4.2.1.), but as soon as you combine two propositional contents, then the causal
sense appears.
3. General conclusion
We must conclude that, as far as the properties examined in 2.4. are concerned, French, English,
Danish, Hungarian and Japanese have almost the same syntax. In all five languages, the space and
time adjuncts differ fundamentally – and in the same ways – from the causal adjuncts, although
these  languages,  being  typologicaly  different,  differ  from each  other  in  many other  important
respects. This fits so nicely in the model that Kant presents in Critique. 
Therefore  we must  also conclude that  Hamann and Herder  and their  many followers  are
completely wrong when they allege that Kant was unaware of the role  language played in  the
construction of his own cognitive model! What Kant's model describes in Critique is not dependent
on any particular language nore on any particular culture. It is determined by our bodily apparatus. I
think it is very probable that the discussed differences between the time and space expressions on
the one side, and causal expressions on the other belong to those "universals that constitute the
backdrop of any typology"29 (Herslund 2015).
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